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Objective: The process of understanding the causes of adverse events associated with complex engi-
neered systems can be time consuming and expensive. It often requires substantial human and physical
resources ranging from a few engineers up to multiple teams of domain specialists from collaborating
organisations. The research presented in this article aims to provide more effective support to the ana-
lysts involved in root cause analysis (RCA) by exploring the combined application of the Issue Based
Information System (IBIS) and the Function Analysis Diagram (FAD) methods. The first method (IBIS)
introduces the concept of argument-based rationale for explicit justification of the nodes of a cause–
effect chain as well as of redesign decisions, while the second method (FAD) introduces the notion of
structure-dependent functional modelling of complex systems in normal and failure states.
Method: Causation data from publicly available technical reports of the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster
was reverse-engineered using a root cause analysis approach based on the IBIS and FAD notations. IBIS
and FAD were implemented using a free and open source software tool known as designVUE. The
approach was evaluated by comparing it to a method for root cause analysis widely used in industry
and assessing how it satisfies generic requirements for root cause analysis.
Results: The results show that the proposed IBIS-FAD approach provides a rich description of the causes
for an accident presented in a manner that facilitates information access and understanding. The IBIS
notation allowed for explicit modelling of the reasons supporting or refuting failure hypotheses along
with evidence. The FAD notation provided a clear and concise method to visualise the complex set of
non-linear interactions leading to the failure of a system by annotating graphical schematics of the design
with the functions exchanged between its components. Finally, the results show that the approach
supports the capture and justification of redesign decisions and ties them to initiating problems in a
way that promotes the prevention of accident re-occurrence.
Conclusions: Argument-based rationale with IBIS and FAD-style functional modelling are powerful con-
cepts to extend the tool set available to support the root cause analysis process. The approach proposed
in this article provides a unique tool that would be of value to academics, practitioners, and regulators
concerned with root cause analysis and opportunities to improve the process of understanding adverse
events.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
At present, the pace of technological change is faster than ever
and system developers are under constant pressure to reduce thetime to market. At the same time, newly engineered systems are
increasingly complex and have many unknowns in terms of inter-
action between components and relationships between humans
and automation (Leveson, 2004, 2011). The design of these systems
requires significant resources to identify and mitigate risks and to
understand potential failure modes. However, despite the applica-
tion of engineering analysis and failure prevention methods, it
remains a major challenge for engineering teams to fully under-
stand system behaviour (Marais et al., 2004) and every year serious
accidents are reported across a wide range of industries often
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penalties (Saleh et al., 2010). Root cause analysis is proposed to
clarify the causes of accidents and prevent future accidents from
happening (Kum and Sahin, 2015) by showing how and why
redesign solutions will prevent accident reoccurrence.
The results of accident investigations are typically reported in
long and detailed documents, which explain the root cause analy-
sis and present the recommendations that are intended to avoid
any recurrence of the failures. The value of the conclusions often
depends on the analysis methods employed as well as on the abil-
ity of the investigators (Dien et al., 2012; Lundberg et al., 2009).
Event chain methods such as the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA; Ferry,
1988) and the Fishbone diagram (Ishikawa, 1982) are the industry
standard for root cause analysis and have been applied in indus-
tries including aerospace, defence, railway, automotive, oil and
gas, chemical processing and nuclear. The construction of event
chains by analysts usually requires a deep understanding of the
system. Event chain methods, using predominantly linear causality
relationships (Leveson, 2004), describe how certain behaviours of
the system components combine to result in a system failure.
The effectiveness of event chain methods has been frequently
questioned (Leveson, 2004). Specifically, it is not known how the
understanding of accidents generated through these methods can
be extended to explain the reasons of accidents. There is also a
need to support analysts in explaining how the physical system
worked and understanding non-linear systems behaviours during
normal operation and non-normal or failure states. Finally,
analysts require a method to support the explanation of how and
why redesign solutions will prevent accident reoccurrence.
To address these issues, the work presented in this article pro-
poses an approach to enable root cause analysis analysts to: justify
the nodes of event chain methods; model system behaviour in
normal and failure states; and capture and justify redesign solutions
while providing traceability of the root cause analyses results. It is
believed that a root cause analysis approach that can address these
aims would offer the following benefits. First, such an approach
would provide deeper understanding of accidents to prevent future
re-occurrence. Second, the approach would help analysts to under-
stand how the system components interacted and what system
components failed. Third, the approach would allow to link failure
modes, useful and harmful functions, and current and redesigned
solutions. The proposed approach, that will be presented here,
draws on and expands upon current practice in industry to model
the causes of complex system failure (Bracewell et al., 2009; Eng
et al., 2012). In particular, it employs the Issue Based Information
System (IBIS) notation (Kunz and Rittel, 1970; Bracewell et al.,
2009) to map causal chains along with argument-based rationale,
and the Function Analysis Diagram (FAD) notation (Aurisicchio
et al., 2012; Aurisicchio and Bracewell, 2013b) to model system
behaviour in normal and failure states. The main aspects of the
approach are illustrated using causality data from the Space Shuttle
Challenger disaster. Causality information documented in investi-
gation reports was represented using the IBIS and FAD methods as
implemented in a software tool known as the design-Visual-Under
standing-Environment (designVUE) (Baroni et al., 2013; Hooey
et al., 2014). It is believed that the proposed approach offers a
promising extension to the tool set currently available to engineers.
Thiswork is important to understand how to aid engineers tasked to
investigate major adverse events.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2
provides background on root cause analysis and functional mod-
elling methods. Section 3 proposes our novel approach to root
cause analysis, which combines application of the IBIS and FAD
methods. Section 4 presents a case study based on the analysis of
the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster using a reverse engineering
approach. In particular, publicly available data from the SpaceShuttle Challenger disaster was modelled using the proposed
methods. Section 5 evaluates the research results showing how
the proposed approach compares to an existing method for root
cause analysis and meets a set of requirements extracted from
the literature. Section 6 discusses the proposed approach and its
limitations are presented in Section 7. Section 8 draws the conclu-
sions of the research.2. Related work
A distinction can be drawn between theoretical models of acci-
dent causation and methods for root cause analysis. Theoretical
models explain possible causation mechanisms of accidents based
on general frameworks or conceptual hypotheses. They describe
generic scenarios for accident occurrences irrespective of the speci-
fic setting (Katsakiori et al., 2009). Various theoretical models of
accident causation have been proposed over time (e.g., Normal
Accident Theory, Perrow, 1999; High Reliability Organisations,
Rochlin et al., 1987; Weick, 1987; and Reason’s Accident Causation
(Swiss Cheese) Model, Reason, 1990) and reviews of such models
can be found in (Katsakiori et al., 2009; Saleh et al., 2010). Meth-
ods, by contrast, provide practical support to investigate and to
explain causation mechanisms. Interestingly, not all methods for
root cause analysis have a link to a model of accident causation–
event chain methods such as FTA are an example of this. This
section reviews methods for root cause analysis and applications
of functional modelling to support understanding of failure.2.1. Root cause analysis
This section focuses on methods for root cause analysis used in
industry to clarify the causes of accidents and prevent future
accidents from happening. However, it also considers methods
for failure prevention applied during the design process to foresee
possible future failures. These methods are included as they
provide insights into modelling causation.
The list of methods for root cause analysis is long. Comprehen-
sive reviews and comparisons of methods for failure analysis have
been presented elsewhere (Livingston et al., 2001; Doggett, 2004,
2005; Gano, 2007; Katsakiori et al., 2009). These methods have
been classified according to various dimensions including: (i) the
stage of the product development process that they aim to support,
e.g., design (failure prevention) or in-service (failure analysis);
(ii) the level of guidance and structure that they offer during the
root cause analysis process; (iii) the type of information that users
have to capture; and (iv) the directionality of the search, i.e.,
forward or backward in time. This review does not aim to
cover the whole set of available methods. Rather it focuses on
industry-standard event chain methods for failure analysis and
selected systemic methods, i.e., those that consider the whole
system including social organisational factors, management, regu-
lations policies, etc. Specifically, the methods selected for review
are the Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) (Stamatis, 1995), the
Fishbone diagram (Ishikawa, 1982), the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
(Ferry, 1988), the Cause Map (ThinkReliability, 2014), the Apollo
Root Cause Analysis (Gano, 2007), the Accimap (Svedung and
Rasmussen, 2002) and Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and
Processes (STAMP), (Leveson, 2004). Each of the selected methods
is now reviewed in turn.
FMEA is commonly described as a forward method for failure
prevention used to identify the effects of a single failure mode of
a system. In addition to the consequence (effect) of the failure
mode and the failure mode itself, the method also captures infor-
mation about the antecedent (cause) of the failure mode. Hence,
the analysis is conducted by alternating searches that look forward
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to justify the causal links between a failure mode and its causes
and effects.
The Fishbone diagram is a backward method for root cause
analysis, which allows causes to be logically and hierarchically
structured using pre-defined categories. It has been noted that it
does not let users distinguish between necessary and sufficient
conditions for the occurrence of an event (Gano, 2007). Another
typical criticism of this method is that placing causes in pre-
defined categories, e.g., Manpower, Method, Material, Machine
Measurement and Environment, does not provide a complete
understanding of the causal relationships because it forces the ana-
lyst to fit causes into categories which do not always provide accu-
rate description of a failure (Gano, 2007). Despite these limitations,
the method is still frequently applied in industry; a recent example
of application is the Toyota Motor Corporation Unintended
Acceleration Investigation (NASA, 2011).
The FTA is a backward method for root cause analysis typically
employed to analyse, using Boolean logic, an undesired state of a
system and its causes (Ferry, 1988). FTA is an analytical tool for
establishing relations between events but it does not give guidance
as to what information to gather.
It is noteworthy that none of the root cause analysis methods
discussed thus far (FMEA, the Fishbone diagram and FTA) provides
justification for the nodes of a causation chain. That is, they do not
support the capture of rationale and evidence to explain why it is
believed that an event occurred and led to an effect. This is consid-
ered important information for validating a root cause analysis and
ensuring that future designs will be able to make use of the
lessons-learned from the analysis.
Differently, the next two methods considered in this review
(Cause Map and Apollo Root Cause Analysis) do support the analyst
in documenting justifications for the nodes of a causation chain,
and on this basis they are compared more closely. The Cause
Map is a method to visually explain why an event occurred by con-
necting individual cause–effect relationships to reveal the system
of causes for an issue (ThinkReliability, 2014), see Fig. 1a. To help
visualise the analysis, evidence can be documented directly on
the Cause Map. Evidence refers to information about how it is
thought that an event occurred, and can be derived from many
sources such as a statement or testimony, a diagram, a historical
trend, an experiment or test results. During the analysis, evidence
may also disprove a particular cause. When this happens, the evi-
dence that disproves the cause is placed below the cause and the
cause is crossed out, but not removed from the Cause Map. This
helps capture the causes that were considered, but ultimately
determined not to be related to the incident. A limitation of this
method is that it does not capture the rationale justifying the
degree of certainty that an event occurred and led to an effect.
Apollo Root Cause Analysis is a method for failure analysis that
consists of drawing a cause–effect tree (Gano, 2007), see Fig. 1b. It
is rooted in four principles of causation: causes and effects are the
same thing; causes and effects are part of an infinite continuum of
causes; each effect has at least two causes in the form of one or
more actions and one or more conditions; and an effect exists only
if its causes exist at the same point in time and space. In the Apollo
Root Cause Analysis method, causes are distinguished between
action causes and condition causes, see Fig. 1b. An action cause is
described as ‘a cause that interacts with a condition to cause an
effect’, while a condition cause is described as ‘a static cause that
exists over time prior to an action bringing them together to cause
an effect’ (Gano, 2007). Hence, action and condition causes are
linked by an AND logic relation. In the Apollo root cause analysis
method, evidence can be captured in the form of a short piece of
text, see Fig. 1b, with pre-selected options available including
observation, written document, verbal statement, heard sounds,as well as smelled, tasted and touched evidence. Additional textual
evidence can be captured as a reference but it is not displayed in
the main tree. Rather it pops up in an additional window when
needed. Similarly to the Cause Map, this method captures the evi-
dence for an event but it falls short of documenting the rationale
for why it is thought that an event occurred and led to an effect.
Looking back on the class of traditional methods reviewed, it
can be seen that they all rely on tree-like causation structures
and as a result they tend to explain failure using a linear logic. In
addition, these methods are rarely used to understand non-
technical causes (Leveson, 2004) such as management. To address
the limitations of traditional methods, a new class of systemic
methods (Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002; Leveson, 2004) is emerg-
ing, which represent accidents as complex socio-technical systems
phenomena (Salmon et al., 2012). Although evaluation of systemic
methods is receiving increasing attention, little is currently known
about the use of these methods by practitioners (Underwood and
Waterson, 2013; Underwood et al., 2016). The Accimap is an
example of a method from this class used to graphically represent
system failures, decisions and actions involved in accidents.
Accimap analyses, based on Rasmussen’s risk management frame-
work (Rasmussen, 1997), typically focus on failures across six
levels: government policy and budgeting; regulatory bodies and
associations; company management; technical and operational
management; physical processes and actor activities; and equip-
ment and surroundings. Similarly to Rasmussen’s framework,
STAMP views accidents in complex systems as resulting from pres-
sures at multiple levels including physical, social and economic
(Leveson, 2004). STAMP focuses on safety as a control problem.
Hierarchical safety structures with multiple control levels and
constraints imposed on the behaviour and interaction of system
components are used to describe systems (Leveson, 2004). The
events leading to losses are consequently due to inadequate
control or enforcement of constraints on the development and
operation of systems.
2.2. Functional modelling
Functional modelling has long been applied in engineering to
support failure prevention. FMEA is an example of a method for
failure prevention involving functional analysis in the early phases
of method implementation (Otto and Wood, 2001). There have,
however, also been more sophisticated applications of functional
modelling in failure prevention (Kmenta et al., 1999; Hari and
Weiss, 1999; Stone et al., 2005a, 2005b; El Ariss et al., 2011).
One of these is the Function Failure Design Method (FFDM)
(Stone et al., 2005a, 2005b). Compared to FMEA, FFDM aims to
guide failure prevention during conceptual design using a func-
tional model known as the function structure (Pahl et al., 2007).
The function structure is a form-independent functional model
(i.e., a model which does not rely on product structure or geometry
to model functions) (Aurisicchio et al., 2012; Aurisicchio and
Bracewell, 2013b) consisting of specifying the overall function of
the product under development and then of determining and
mapping the sub-functions involved as blocks and the flows of
matter, energy and signals as arrows. Despite this work, there is
no evidence in the literature that functional modelling has been
used to support root cause analysis in the aftermath of an accident.
However, we propose that explaining the behaviour of structures
during failure in this manner could prove to be an useful addition
to existing root cause analysis methods.
2.3. Summary
Overall, current event chain methods for root cause analysis
were found to lack explicit documentation of either the rationale
Fig. 1. Cause Map by ThinkReliability (A); Apollo Root Cause Analysis (B).
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gram and FTA), or just the rationale (e.g., Cause Map and Apollo
Root Cause Analysis). The ability to explain non-linear interactions
between systems components was also identified as a limitation of
the methods. Additionally, it was found that there is no method-
ological support to use functional modelling during after-the-fact
root cause analysis.
3. A new approach to root cause analysis: IBIS and FAD
This section introduces the IBIS and FAD methods as the main
components of the proposed approach to root cause analysis
introduced in this article, and designVUE as the software through
which the methods were implemented.
3.1. Issue Based Information System (IBIS)
In general, the design and diagnosis of complex systems require
engineers and other stakeholders to make decisions by exploring
alternative options and arguing for their merits and demerits.
As a result the need for argument-based approaches in engineering
has long been recognised, and argumentation has been success-
fully applied in engineering design, reliability engineering and
safety engineering through methods such as design rationale
charts (Marashi and Davis, 2006; Bracewell et al., 2009;
Aurisicchio and Bracewell, 2013a), safety cases (Kelly and
McDermid, 2001) and Conclusion, Analysis, Evidence (CAE) dia-
grams (Johnson, 2001). Each of these methods employs a different
notation for argument modelling, which is specific to its context of
application.
3.1.1. IBIS for design
Design rationale charts (Bracewell et al., 2009) are based on the
Issue Based Information System (IBIS) notation (Kunz and Rittel,
1970), which allows capturing argument-based rationale for an
answer to an issue. The notation is composed of four fundamental
elements called issue, answer, pro argument and con argument. In
design, the argumentation process starts by formulating an issue in
the form of a design question, see Fig. 2 (left example). The next
step consists of listing possible answers in the form of solutions.
The answers are then weighed against each other using arguments.At this point a choice has to be made between the possible answers
in order to select ‘the best’ one.
In root cause analysis the argumentation process still starts by
formulating an issue but this time in the form of a why-question
or diagnosis question, see Fig. 2 (right example). The next step
consists of identifying possible answers in the form of causes.
The answers are then assessed on the basis of argument-based
rationale and supporting evidence. At this stage further why-
questions can be asked in relation to the identified causes to
understand if lower-level causes emerge. The result is a causation
tree that captures all of the possible causes along with the
supporting rationale and evidence. Note that in Fig. 2 the first
why-question is explicit (why does the car not start?), while the
subsequent why-question (why is the battery flat?) is implicit
and the lower-level cause (lights were left on) is linked directly
to that identified at the higher level (battery is flat).
3.1.2. IBIS for root cause analysis
IBIS has been extensively applied in engineering design
(Marashi and Davis, 2006; Bracewell et al., 2009; Aurisicchio and
Bracewell, 2013a) but the literature does not report applications
to support root cause analysis, with one exception by Bracewell
et al. (2009). This work, considered a pre-cursor to the current pro-
ject, used IBIS to diagnose an in-service problem to a civil aviation
gas turbine, see Fig. 3. The method used by Bracewell et al. (2009)
can be classed as an enhanced form of event chain, and combined
features of FTA and design rationale capture tools (Kunz and Rittel,
1970). In particular, FTA was effective at clearly delineating cause–
effect relationships, and contributed the rigor of Boolean logic to
map cause–effect chains with explicit AND and implicit OR rela-
tions. The design rationale capture aspect was, instead, responsible
for the argument-based approach to justify causation chains. As it
can be seen in Fig. 3, the root of the causation tree is a diagnosis
question that is answered by identifying six possible causes and
articulating rationale in support for or against each hypothesised
cause. It is noteworthy that the nodes of the tree have colour-
coded states indicating the likelihood that a cause has contributed
to the causation mechanism of an accident.
Specifically the map in Fig. 3 shows that a debonding problem
occurred to a panel of the fan case of a civil aviation gas turbine,
and a range of causes were identified including engine vibration,
Fig. 2. IBIS notation for design problem solving (A) and root cause analysis (B).
Fig. 3. IBIS notation for root cause analysis as implemented in the DRed tool (Bracewell et al., 2009).
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vated temperature, ice impact and pressure loading from the fan
blades. As can be seen, two causes were rejected (fan case flexure
and pressure loading from the fan blades) as indicated by the red1
answer icon (light bulb with X); one cause was accepted (thermally1 For interpretation of color in Figs. 3 and 4, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.induced strain) as indicated by the green answer icon (light bulb
with checkmark); and, three causes are in the open status (engine
vibration, adhesive failure at elevated temperature and ice impact)
as indicated by the yellow answer icon (light bulb).
Since its development, the root cause analysis method shown in
Fig. 3 has gained extensive acceptance and application in
engineering practice at Rolls-Royce plc (Eng et al., 2012). The cur-
rent research expands on this work (Bracewell et al., 2009) by
Fig. 4. FAD notation as implemented in the DRed tool (Aurisicchio et al., 2012; Aurisicchio and Bracewell, 2013b).
246 M. Aurisicchio et al. / Safety Science 85 (2016) 241–257demonstrating the modelling characteristics of the IBIS method by
means of a more comprehensive case study.
3.1.3. The role of argument-based rationale in root cause analysis
We propose that argument-based rationale plays three impor-
tant roles in root cause analysis. First, it can explain why a cause
can or cannot lead to an effect reported at a higher level of a cau-
sation tree. In this case, it validates or confutes a cause–effect link.
Second, it can explain why a proposed cause to an effect may or
may not have occurred. In this case, it validates or confutes a node
in a causation tree. It is noteworthy that in these two cases argu-
ments may be used either to support or oppose. For an argument
to be valid, empirical or experimental evidence gathered as part
of an investigation has to be linked to it to explain on what knowl-
edge basis it stands. When evidence is not documented an argu-
ment is weakened and its validity is questionable. As an example
see how in Fig. 3 the hypothesis that ice impact may contribute
to the de-bonding of the honeycomb panel is supported by a pro
argument stating that some failed panels were found to be
crushed, which is in turn backed up by photographic evidence.
Finally, a third role is that arguments can be used to explain and
justify why costly tasks, such as building a test rig to prove or dis-
prove a hypothesis, have to be carried out.
3.2. Function Analysis Diagram (FAD)
Building on the premise that functional modelling can have an
important role in explaining the behaviour of a failing structure,this research investigates the application of a form-dependent
functional model (i.e., a model which relies on product structure
or geometry to model function) known as the Function Analysis
Diagram (FAD) (Aurisicchio et al., 2012; Aurisicchio and
Bracewell, 2013b) to model system functionality in normal and
failure states. We propose that FAD is particularly suitable to
supporting reasoning during investigations for two main reasons.
The first is that its notation represents functions together with
the physical structure of a system, which is important to contextu-
alise troubleshooting in an existing system. The second is that it is
the only functional model with notation to represent undesired
and harmful functions, which are important to explain the
propagation of failure resulting in an accident.
The FAD method consists of drawing a network of blocks to rep-
resent the physical structure and other resources, and relations in
the form of an arrow with a label (strictly a relation node with
one or more arrows in and out) to represent either useful or harm-
ful actions, see Fig. 4. The diagram in Fig. 4 shows an application of
the FAD method to a centrifugal water pump. The blocks in blue
background are structural components of the pump, while those
in white background represent various states of the water. Useful
relations are typically presented in green but shown here as solid
lines, e.g., lip seal prevents leakage of impeller back plate water,
while harmful ones are typically in red but shown here as solid
lines, e.g., impeller back plate water generates friction on impeller.
The concept of graphical mapping of useful and harmful actions
between the components of a physical structure was originally
published as part of a patent application filed by the TRIZ vendor
Table 1
Information sources.
Source Date
Report to the President on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
(Rogers, 1986a)
06 June
1986
Report to the President Actions to Implement the
Recommendations (Rogers, 1986b)
14 July
1986
Report to the President Implementation of the
Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Rogers, 1987)
__ June
1987
Power to Explore: A History of Marshall Space Flight Center
1960–1990 (Dunar and Waring, 1999)
1999
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was subsequently implemented in the Techoptimizer (now known
as Goldfire) software and represented using five elements: compo-
nent, super-system and product as types of block, and useful and
harmful actions as types of relations.
3.3. Rationale for combined use of IBIS and FAD
Both traditional event chain and newer systemic methods for
root cause analysis involve investigation of the physical system
that failed. Typically during an investigation each analyst has a
gradually developing mental model of how the system worked in
normal operation, and how the adverse circumstances and events
might have impacted that operation. As the analysis proceeds they
do their best to keep their individual mental models in synchroni-
sation by various modes of inter-personal communication, but the
models remain essentially implicit until documented in narrative
text in successive drafts of the accident report. Simultaneous use
of the IBIS and FAD methods was perceived as an opportunity to
support the event-centric view of root cause analysis employed
by traditional methods with a perspective centred on the analysis
of components and functions. In particular, this approach is
expected to help: (i) create a shared mental model of the system
operation; (ii) contextualise the analysis in the engineering prob-
lem, (iii) inform root cause analysis with functional reasoning
(i.e., the ability to derive and explain the functions of structure)
and functional language to achieve improved specification of the
events, and (iv) understand and reason with the multiple non-
linear interactions exchanged between the components of a
system.
3.4. Software implementation of the IBIS and FAD methods
The IBIS and FAD methods were implemented in a software
application, known as designVUE, to draw information models
(in this article also referred to as maps and trees) mostly consisting
of nodes (depicted as boxes with or without icons) and links
(depicted as arrows) among them (Baroni et al., 2013). Each model
is stored in a separate file. Its Graphical User Interface (GUI) con-
sists primarily of a main window, which contains the menu bar,
the toolbar and the editor canvas. The programme does not impose
any restriction as to the way in which a model can be drawn. It is
up to the user to confer any meaning to a model. Two of the model
types supported by designVUE are the IBIS and FAD. In this respect
designVUE can be considered an IBIS-derivative tool such as DRedFig. 5. IBIS notation(Bracewell et al., 2009) and Compendium (Buckingham Shum et al.,
2006). Its advantages over Compendium and DRed are respectively
that it implements an evolved version of the IBIS notation, see
Fig. 5, and it is free and open source software (desginVUE, 2015).
Another feature of designVUE is that it allows users to create
mono-directional hyperlinks between files and external resources,
as well as bi-directional hyperlinks, known as wormhole links,
between its files. In the context of this research, this functionality
is considered important to provide access to relevant documents
(such as event reports or test results), and connectivity between
root cause analysis activities spread across multiple files either
because a model is too large to be managed as one entity or
because different model types are employed. For example, such
functionality has allowed the creation of integrated graphical mod-
els, making explicit the teams’ developing understanding of both
the normal operation and the failure of the system, traceably
linked to the growing event tree as they aim to identify root causes
and to the emerging redesign solutions as they are proposed.
4. Application of the new IBIS and FAD-based approach
This section introduces the Space Shuttle Challenger case study,
and demonstrates application of the enhanced (IBIS and FAD)
approach to root cause analysis proposed in the research.
4.1. Introduction to the case study
The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster occurred in January 1986.
The spacecraft broke apart 73 s into its flight leading to the death of
its seven crew members. Disintegration of the vehicle began after
an O-ring seal in its right solid rocket booster (SRB) failed at lift-
off. The O-ring failure caused a breach in the SRB joint it sealedin designVUE.
248 M. Aurisicchio et al. / Safety Science 85 (2016) 241–257allowing pressurised hot gas from within the solid rocket motor to
reach the outside and impinge upon the adjacent SRB attachment
hardware and external fuel tank. The Space Shuttle Challenger dis-
aster case is probably the most detailed investigation of a modern
technological complex system and of the organisation that devel-
oped it. The fact that the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster has
been studied extensively and from various perspectives makes it
an interesting case to evaluate our approach and contrast it to pre-
vious work.
4.2. Case study data
Engineering data about the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster
was predominantly collected from the publications listed in Table 1Fig. 6. IBIS-based root cause analysis of tbut other sources were used where noted to provide further
insights for the analysis. A reverse engineering approach was
employed to model the data using the IBIS and FAD methods.
The models of the Space Shuttle Challenger root cause analysis
presented in the case study were developed using designVUE and
rely on the hyperlinking functionality mentioned in Section 3.4
to create an integrated space of root cause analysis and redesign
information.
4.3. IBIS-based root cause analysis of the Space Shuttle Challenger
disaster
The IBIS-based root cause analysis of the Space Shuttle
Challenger disaster is shown in Fig. 6. At a high level the roothe Space Shuttle Challenger disaster.
Fig. 7. Detail of the IBIS-based root cause analysis.
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(1) consequences of the joint failure; (2) joint failure; and (3)
events leading to the launch, see Fig. 6. Part 1 explains how the seal
failure propagated through the space shuttle causing its disintegra-
tion. Part 2 focuses on events related to the aft field joint failure.
Finally, part 3 is centred around the decision to launch the space
shuttle and the pressures exerted on NASA personnel on the launch
day. These three aspects involved tracing a combination of
technical and management causal factors.
The cause–effect tree starts with an issue node questioning ‘why
there was a catastrophic failure of Space Shuttle Challenger’, and then
develops by mapping various chains of events through answer
nodes with linked argument-based rationale and evidence nodes.
As it can be seen from the tree in Fig. 6, the method is predomi-
nantly based on the answer nodes with issues nodes infrequently
used. This is because issues nodes, which would consist of asking
why-questions between consecutive answer nodes, are made
implicit to simplify the representation. The cause–effect tree
shows that at the various levels of the analysis multiple hypotheses
were made. Accepted answers at the same level are typically both
able to trigger the higher level event, and therefore are linked to
each other by an implicit OR relationship. When accepted answers
at the same level need to take place concurrently to trigger the
event at the higher level an explicit AND relationship is captured,
see part 2 of Fig. 6. An important characteristic of the method is
the icon graphics and colour coding, which make both the path
of accepted causes leading to the root cause and those towards
the rejected causes very clear and easy to identify, see Fig. 6.Coloured icons are also used to distinguish if an argument supports
or opposes a cause.
In the analysis in Fig. 6 the arguments are laid out to the left of
the main cause–effect chain and evidence statements are linked to
them or directly to the cause effect chain. This layout was chosen
purely for the purpose of making it easier to read the tree. Users
can apply alternative layouts to fit their understanding and
communication needs. It is noteworthy that in this example for
the sake of image clarity the argument and evidence nodes are
mapped for a limited number of answer nodes in part 2 of Fig. 6.
An example of the role of argument-based rationale and
evidence in root cause analysis is shown in Fig. 7, which zooms
on a segment of the root cause analysis presented in Fig. 6 (notably
three nodes within part 2) focusing on the O-ring failure. As it can
be seen, the first node states that pressurised propellant leaked
from the aft field joint. In support of this hypothesis there is
telemetry evidence confirming that the pressure of the right solid
rocket booster was lower than that of the left solid rocket booster.
In addition to this evidence, there are also pro arguments explain-
ing why the propellant leak led to a blast against the external tank
and the aft field joint lower strut attachment. Specifically, it can be
seen that the growing propellant leak generated flames from the
right solid rocket booster and holes in its structure. These pro argu-
ments are supported by evidence statements originating from
video-recordings of the shuttle take-off and the wreckage analysis
report. Hyperlinks to the files presenting these forms of evidence
are also provided from the statements (see video mpg and report
pdf files).
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joint
The FAD method was used in parallel to IBIS to help trace the
part of the root cause analysis tree focusing on the aft field joint
behaviour. In addition to modelling the aft field joint during the
launch and ignition phase, we have modelled it during the assem-
bly and seal testing phases (see Fig. 8) because the Space Shuttle
Challenger investigation showed that concerns emerged in relation
to the assembly and seal testing procedures (Rogers, 1986a). Both
the intended and actual behaviour during launch and ignition were
modelled to identify deviations from expected behaviour.Fig. 9. FAD: aft field joint a
Fig. 8. FAD: aft fieThe FAD model of the actual operation of the aft field joint is
presented in Fig. 9. During launch and ignition various interactions
occurred in the aft field joint, which contributed to its behaviour
and performance. As it can be seen, these were modelled over a
schematic of the aft field joint geometry using blocks and relations.
The blocks were used to represent the physical structure of the aft
field joint (e.g., the primary O-ring, the inside clevis segment,
the tang segment, etc.), the fluids and other conditions (e.g., the
temperature at launch, and the water captured in the joint due
to the overnight rain), while the relations were used to model use-
ful and harmful interactions, see Fig. 9. For example, it is known
that on the day and time of the launch the external temperaturet launch and ignition.
ld joint states.
Fig. 10. IBIS-based design rationale of the aft field joint redesign.
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Fig. 9, to model the behaviour of the aft field joint at a more gran-
ular level some of the blocks are provided with nested sub-blocks
detailing features of components. For example, the inside clevis
segment shows the groove feature. The inclusion of this feature
has been important to explain that at launch and ignition the pri-
mary O-ring was touching all of the three faces of the groove, i.e., it
was not pressure actuated as expected and it did not follow the
opening of the aft field joint.
Placing the blocks in proximity of their actual location on the aft
field joint geometry was found to be useful to contextualise, under-
stand and reason with the multiple non-linear interactions
exchanged in the aft field joint. Hence, the FAD method supported
functional reasoning in failure investigation and, in particular, the
use of functional language to express the nodes of the IBIS-based
root cause analysis. It is noteworthy that harmful interactions in
the FADmodel are also answer nodes in the IBIS root cause analysis
tree presented in Fig. 6 and are bi-directionally hyperlinked to
enable traceability. For example, note that in Fig. 9 the harmful
action ‘did not follow the opening between’ the tang and inside clevis
segments has a bi-directional hyperlink next to it which can be
navigated to an answer node in part 2 of Fig. 6 which states ‘the pri-
mary O-ring did not follow the opening of the joint’. If the user hovers
with the cursor on the hyperlink, information about the destina-
tion file is provided.4.5. IBIS-based rationale for the Space Shuttle Challenger aft field joint
redesign
The IBIS method was also used to map the recommendations for
improved safety and explain how the joint redesigns proposed
after the accident will prevent recurrence of the problem. Fig. 10
shows that a number of design questions were formulated, cap-
tured in the form of issues, and grouped under a higher-level issue.
For example, see that an issue node is used to capture the question
‘how to control the O-ring sealing gap dimension’ and a solution isproposed through an answer node to introduce ‘a tang capture fea-
ture’. It can also be seen that four pro arguments are used to justify
why this solution is adequate. In particular, one of these states that
the capture feature ‘will limit the deflection between the tang and the
clevis O-ring sealing surfaces caused by motor pressure and structural
loads’. In this specific example the pro argument is not backed up
by engineering evidence as this was not available in the data anal-
ysed but this is thought to be an important practice that should be
followed in the method application. It is, however, important to
point out that this argument is also hyperlinked to an answer node
in the IBIS root cause analysis in Fig. 6, which states that the ‘joint
casing started to open and close’. This practice is important as it
demonstrates that a problem that emerged during the investiga-
tion is addressed by redesign and shows how traceability is main-
tained between the problem solving and the root cause analysis
documents.
5. Evaluation of the new IBIS and FAD-based approach
This section assesses the new IBIS- and FAD-based approach by
investigating how it compares to an established root cause analysis
method and how it satisfies evaluation requirements for root cause
analysis methods that have been established in the literature.
5.1. Evaluation against the Cause Map
To evaluate the root cause analysis approach proposed in this
article, we compare it to the Cause Map method. Among the root
cause analysis methods presented in Section 2.1, the Cause Map
was selected because of its wide application in industrial settings
and because of its explicit support for evidence documentation.
The comparison focuses on modelling information to justify the
nodes of an event chain using IBIS-based root cause analysis and
the Cause Map.
Fig. 11 shows a Cause Map for the Space Shuttle Challenger
accident as published in (ThinkReliability, 2015). Although more
Fig. 11. Challenger Cause Map (ThinkReliability, 2015).
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ThinkReliability as shown in Galley and Griffith, 2014, these were
deemed not important for the argument made in this section.
The node labelled ‘‘Safety Goal Impacted” to the far left of
Fig. 11 (in dark-colour background) is the root of the tree. The
chain of nodes linked to the root (in white-colour background)
visually explains the sequence of events that occurred. The nodes
with headings evidence and possible solution (in light-colour back-
ground) capture respectively evidence and redesign solutions.
The first point of comparison between the Cause Map and the
IBIS-based root cause analysis method is the event chain generated
with each approach. It is noteworthy that there is very close corre-
spondence between the two approaches as can be seen by compar-
ing the nodes of the Challenger Cause Map in Fig. 11 to the IBIS
map in Fig. 6. Specifically, the first three nodes in part 2 of
Fig. 11 (propellant leak in aft field joint; aft field joint fully eroded;
and primary O-ring blow by) correspond to those for the IBIS map
in Fig. 7.
Another similarity between the two methods is their ability to
capture evidence. For example, the Cause Map (Fig. 11) includes
a statement of evidence citing previous issues with O-ring erosion
and the IBIS map (Fig. 7) shows examples of evidence based on
analysis reports and video clips of the shuttle take-off. However,
it is noted that even though the Cause Map does allow for the cap-
ture of evidence statements, the sample event chain shown in
Fig. 11 includes only one instance, suggesting that the degree to
which evidence is documented may be dependent on the analyst
(note that this applies also to the detailed Challenger Causal Maps
in Galley and Griffith, 2014). In this research we have, instead,
shown how arguments and evidence can be systematically cap-
tured using the IBIS map.
One main difference between the Cause Map and IBIS map
involves the capture of argument-based rationale, or the reasons
for why an event occurred and why it was believed that it could
or could not lead to the effect reported at a higher level of the cau-
sation tree. The Cause Map does not support the documentation of
argument-based rationale, whereas the IBIS map enables the ana-
lysts to justify the nodes of the event chain adding ‘pro’ or ‘con’
arguments. For example, recall that in Fig. 7, it was shown that
there were two arguments that supported the hypothesis that
there was a propellant leak from the aft field joint (the leak gener-
ated flames and holes in the structure).
Another difference between the two methods lies in how rede-
sign information is captured. Fig. 11 indicates that the Cause Map
method mixes root cause analysis and redesign information within
the same canvas with the risk of cluttering the map and compro-
mising its legibility. This is in contrast to the approach proposed
in this article, in which these two aspects of the analysis are cap-tured in separate files, which are then hyperlinked for the purpose
of providing traceability. It is believed that separating root cause
analysis and redesign information is beneficial because these are
separate activities often carried out by different engineering teams.
In addition, as we have shown, this practice allows capturing a
detailed redesign information space including accepted and
rejected solutions together with their design rationale.
Finally, the current approach is unique in that it supplements
the event chain documentation with the FAD component. As has
been argued previously, this is advantageous because it can
help contextualise the analysis with functional reasoning and
supports understanding of non-linear interactions between system
components.
Overall, the comparison between these two methods shows
that while both produce similar event chains, the IBIS method
introduces a systematic practice for capturing argument-based
rationale and evidence, which provides important information to
explain why events in a causal chain occurred and led to specific
effects. In sum, it is argued that the IBIS approach yields richer,
more useful, and reusable information.5.2. Evaluation against requirements for root cause analysis methods
Another route to evaluate the proposed IBIS- and FAD-based
root cause analysis approach is to compare it to established root
cause analysis method requirements available in the literature.
Reviews of requirements used for this purpose can be found in
Gano, 2007, and Katsakiori et al., 2009. The six criteria proposed
by Gano (Gano, 2007) and five requirements identified by
Katsakiori et al. (2009) are presented in Table 2. A major difference
between the two sets of requirements is that Gano focused on
aspects specific to the root cause analysis process, while Katsakiori
considered a broader set of aspects including, for example, the
application field of the method and the training required. Compar-
ing the two sets it was found that some requirements overlap, and
a total of eight unique requirements was identified, see Table 2,
which will be used to evaluate the IBIS- and FAD-based approach
proposed in this research.
The proposed approach, involving the concurrent use of the IBIS
and FAD methods, is now evaluated against the eight require-
ments. Before presenting the evaluation it is worth stating that
the IBIS method has been extensively used in Rolls-Royce to sup-
port the root cause analysis of advanced propulsion systems for
aerospace applications (Aurisicchio and Bracewell, 2013a). Despite
being used to support the investigation of aerospace systems, there
is nothing in the IBIS method that would prevent it from being
used in other domains as the content is not specific. The origins
of the IBIS method as used in this particular application can be
Table 2
Evaluation requirements for root cause analysis methods.
Requirement (Gano, 2007) (Katsakiori et al.,
2009)
R1: descriptive I Clearly defines the problem
and its significance to the
problem owner
R1: descriptive II Clearly delineates the known
causal relationships that
combine to cause the problem;
clearly establish causal
relationships between the root
cause(s) and the defined
problem
Provides a detailed
description of the
accident
R3: revealing Searches for
underlying causes
R4: evidence Clearly presents the evidence
used to support the existence
of identified causes
R5: consequential Clearly explain how the
solutions will prevent
recurrence of the defined
problem
Generates
recommendations for
improved safety
R6: reporting Clearly documents criteria 1
through to 5 in a final root
cause analysis report so others
can easily follow the logic of
the analysis
R7: validation Has been validated
R8: practical Requires minimal
education and
training in order to
use
Note that two requirements proposed in (Gano, 2007) are classed as descriptive II;
and the application field and theoretical origin requirements proposed in (Katsakiori
et al., 2009) are omitted because they are more descriptive in nature than
evaluative.
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(Katsakiori et al., 2009). Hence, IBIS does not carry a distinct theo-
retical view on accident causation.
Requirement 1: descriptive I (Clearly define the problem). This
requirement entails specifying what happened when and where.
In the proposed approach, the major problem, i.e., the loss of the
Space Shuttle Challenger and its crewmembers, is formulated
and captured by means of an issue node, which is also the root
of the IBIS tree structure. The significance of the problem state-
ment can be supported by linking arguments and evidence. For
example, event reports can be linked to the root of the tree to
inform the initial investigation of the problem. It is important to
mention that while the IBIS tree-structure enables the capture of
this information, there is nothing in the approach that guides users
to capture specific information categories. It is rather up to the
analyst to determine how to achieve this.
Requirement 2: descriptive II (Provide a detailed description of the
accident). This requirement implies identifying the causal relation-
ships linking the root cause to the problem. The proposed approach
addresses this requirement in four ways. First, the IBIS method,
albeit dependent on the analyst’s skill and ability, captures the
relationships between causes at different levels using a clear logic.
Second, the IBIS method allows showing the pathway from the ini-
tial problem towards its root causes using a clear visual notation.
This is expected to help focus the attention of an investigation
team on the current most likely hypothesis as well as to communi-
cate the current state of an investigation to stakeholders. Third, the
FAD method supports causal thinking in the context of the struc-
ture and behaviour of the system being analysed. Given that FAD
is also applicable with newer systemic methods, and that it can
be used for hierarchical modelling of a whole system structure
and behaviour (Aurisicchio et al., 2012), the method addresses
the need for more sophisticated analytical tools advocated inprevious research (Leveson, 2011). Fourth, the FAD method helps
visualise and reason with multiple events which are often best
modelled through a non-linear diagram (Leveson, 2004). Hence,
the FAD method provides useful information to complement the
predominantly linear logic supported by IBIS.
Requirement 3: revealing (Search for underlying causes). This
requirement refers to extending analyses beyond technical causes,
an issue that has long limited the understanding of accidents.
Event chain methods are often criticised because they do not allow
fitting all types of causal factors (Leveson, 2004). However,
although IBIS for root cause analysis may be considered an event
chain method, it does not explicitly make a distinction between
immediate and underlying causes. It is up to the user’s ability to
pursue an investigation until the root causal factors, whether they
are related to technical, operator or management issues, are uncov-
ered. The case study has shown that the IBIS method can be used to
map both technical and management-oriented causes. Hence, it
seems that the method is fit to model most causes and that its
outcomes depend on the perspective of the user on accident
causation rather than on the method itself.
Requirement 4: evidence (Clearly present the evidence). This
requirement refers to explicitly capturing causation evidence, i.e.,
information about how an event occurred. The IBIS method fulfils
this requirement because it can support the capture of evidence.
However, it goes beyond evidence documentation as it captures
also argument-based rationale, i.e., the reasons for why an event
occurred and led to a certain effect. This aspect of the method
aligns well with the perspectives reported in (Leveson, 2004),
where a shift is advocated from understanding accidents in terms
of causes (which have a limited blame orientation) to understand-
ing accidents in terms of reasons to prevent future re-occurrence.
Requirement 5: consequential (Clearly explain how the solution
addresses the problem). This requirement refers to formulating
specific redesign recommendations for accident prevention. In the
proposed approach this requirement is satisfied because the IBIS
method is used both to diagnose a problem and to propose solutions
while maintaining forward and backward traceability between the
maps for root cause analysis and design. This is a distinctive feature
of the proposed approach as it ensures that a causal relationship
exists between the root causes and the corrective actions.
Requirement 6: reporting (Clearly document the logic for the
analysis). This requirement entails documenting the logic for the
analysis. It can be considered addressed as the IBIS method leaves
users with a justified cause–effect tree and a rationalised design
that can be manually converted from a diagrammatic form to a
linear narrative such as those in the technical reports commonly
produced at the end of failure investigations.
Requirement 7: validation (Has been validated). This requirement
is considered a prerequisite for the use of a method. Validation is
commonly considered to include two components: reliability and
validity. A method is reliable if multiple users use the method
and reach the same conclusions, whereas a method is valid if there
is correspondence between the results of the analysis and reality
(Katsakiori et al., 2009). The proposed approach, like the large
majority of the failure analysis methods in the literature
(Katsakiori et al., 2009), was not tested for either of these and,
therefore, still requires a formal research-based validation.
However, the IBIS method as implemented in the DRed tool
(Bracewell et al., 2009) has been extensively used by engineers in
Rolls-Royce to support the root cause analysis of real world prob-
lems. For example, the method was used during the diagnosis of
the 2008 British Airways accident (King, 2010), in which a Boeing
777-236ER experienced an engine failure, while carrying out an
approach to London Heathrow Airport. The method was used
internally by Rolls Royce (the engine manufacturer) to analyse
potential causes of the engine failure as well as to support
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aviation authority. A mark of the perceived effectiveness of the
method is that it was again used three years later, in the investiga-
tion of the uncontained engine failure on Qantas QF32, an Airbus
A380 climbing through 7000 ft after departure from Singapore
Changi Airport (Research Excellence Framework, 2014). The
Rolls-Royce Chief Engineer and the Chief Design Engineer of the
Trent 900 engine at the time, and their team of approximately
300 engineers, made extensive use of DRed in conducting the root
cause analysis. Once the root cause was established beyond
reasonable doubt, DRed was used again to evaluate the design
solution (Research Excellence Framework, 2014). On the basis of
this acceptance it is argued that the method provides benefits to
its users. Differently, the FAD extension requires further
acceptance, research, and application to real problems before
considering any formal validation.
Requirement 8: practical (Require minimal education and training).
This requirement refers to a user’s ability to apply the method with
minimal education and training. The IBIS-based approach to root
cause analysis has been taught in Rolls-Royce through two-hour
training sessions. Training has typically consisted of introducing
the IBIS notation to users and showing its application to support
root cause analysis by means of past accident case studies. The
use of IBIS for root cause analysis differs substantially from con-
ventional use in design as the diagram often results in long chains
of causal factors underpinned by arguments. The method was
developed in close consultation with accident investigation engi-
neers to address the limitations of current practices at the time
of the research. Its wide acceptance by the Rolls-Royce accident
investigation community can be taken as a measure of its ease of
use. The FAD component of the approach is new and, therefore,
its training requirements for root cause analysis are not known.
6. Discussion
This research was undertaken to improve the practice of root
cause analysis and support effective redesign. The approach pre-
sented in this article consists of using the IBIS notation to build a
FTA-style event chain with supporting argument-based rationale,
and the FAD notation to model the functional interactions between
the components of a system in normal and failure states. In this
section we reflect on the types of events covered by the proposed
approach, the role of argument-based rationale in organisational
safety, and the potential to support the collection of a rich causa-
tion knowledge base.
6.1. The need to apply failure analysis methods across the entire
lifecycle
As stated earlier in this article the proposed approach is funda-
mentally an event chain with extensions to support argument andFig. 12. Extending root cause analysis beyondfunctional modelling. A criticism of traditional event chain models
is that they concentrate on the events immediately preceding an
accident when the foundations of accidents are often laid years
before (Leveson, 2004; Dien et al., 2012). This suggests that acci-
dent investigations should ‘go upstream’ and look into the design
and development of failed systems. The reason is that after an
event, it is important to make sense of what was not appreciated
in real time (Dien et al., 2012). In particular, Leveson (Leveson,
2004), based on research in the context of the Space Shuttle
Challenger disaster, has argued that to understand why the acci-
dent occurred the following four questions had to be answered:
Q1 why was the joint design unsuccessful in imposing the constraint,
i.e., it did not adequately seal the gap; Q2 why was the joint design
chosen (what was the decision process); Q3 was there a different
design that might have been more successful; Q4 why was the flaw
not found during development (Leveson, 2004). In the next
paragraphs we explore how to answer these four questions during
an investigation, see Fig. 12.
While we acknowledge that our application of the IBIS and FAD
methods has focused on events strictly prior to the accident and it
has answered just the first question (Q1) proposed by Leveson
(see Fig. 12), we agree that the other questions require inquiry
and we believe that our previous research in (Aurisicchio and
Bracewell, 2013a; Hooey et al., 2014) proposes a solution.
Answering the second (Q2) and third (Q3) question requires
uncovering the design rationale for the aft field joint, i.e., the
reasons why it was designed the way it is and why it was
accepted as a solution over other concepts, see Fig. 12. If the ini-
tial design rationale was well documented it would be relatively
easy to answer those questions. However, in current engineering
practice design rationale is rarely documented. Rather it is often
stored in the heads of the engineers who developed the design
(Bracewell et al., 2009; Aurisicchio and Bracewell, 2013a). To
support the capture of design rationale the authors of this article
have proposed to use the IBIS method (Aurisicchio and Bracewell,
2013a; Hooey et al., 2014) as shown for the joint redesign, see
Fig. 10. In the context of a failure investigation of a system for
which the design rationale was not documented, IBIS could still
be used to model it retrospectively and link the tree to the root
cause analysis.
Answering the fourth question (Q4) requires reconstructing the
development process of the design, see Fig. 12. For example, it is
known that during the development and in-service life of the Space
Shuttle Challenger, important events occurred well before the acci-
dent itself. The outcomes of development processes and in-service
experience often exist as data but the understanding and
knowledge derived from the interpretation of such data is rarely
captured. To support this it is envisaged that the events preceding
an accident could be captured through a specific IBIS-based root
cause analysis diagram, which is then linked to the main event
chain.the events strictly prior to an accident.
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real-time decision making
In Section 3.1 we proposed that argument-based rationale has
important roles in root cause analysis including explaining causal
relationships and justifying the investment of costly testing
resources. We now want to reflect on additional roles that
argument-based rationale can have in organisational safety. To this
end we revisit the decision to launch the Space Shuttle Challenger,
which was informed by testing data collected during the develop-
ment phase. This decision is of interest because it has been studied
from numerous perspectives including power-oriented and
cultural approaches (Antonsen, 2009; Perrow, 1999; Vaughan,
1997). As reported in (Rogers, 1986a), the night before the Chal-
lengers’ launch the O-ring problem was the subject of teleconfer-
ences between NASA and Morton Thiokol (the contractor
responsible for the solid rocket booster). The engineers of Morton
Thiokol expressed concerns that the combination of rubber
O-rings and cold weather could threaten the safety of the mission,
and recommended delaying the launch. Ultimately, under
immense pressure to proceed with the launch, the engineers’
warnings that the combination of rubber O-rings and cold weather
could threaten the safety of the mission went unheeded. What is
interesting is that in the testimony provided to the Rogers Com-
mission, the Morton Thiokol’s engineer who voiced the highest
concern about launching in cold weather stated: ‘I was not even
asked to participate in giving any input to the final decision charts.
(. . .) I did not agree with some of the statements that were being
made to support the decision. I was never asked nor polled, and
it was clearly a management decision from that point’ (Rogers,
1986a, p. 228). Based on this extract, power-oriented theorists
have argued that the argument of the Morton Thiokol’s engineer
was sidelined in the concluding phases of the decision making pro-
cess (Antonsen, 2009) and that this illustrates how the opinion of
the less powerful can disappear when real decisions are made
(Antonsen, 2009). Still, theorists supporting a cultural perspective
on safety (Vaughan, 1997) have argued that engineers at NASA
and Morton Thiokol were immersed into a ‘technical culture’ cen-
tred around positivist rationality. Within this culture, decisions
were based on evidence emerging from rigorous quantitative anal-
ysis and testing rather than hunches and intuition. Hence, these
theorists suggest that the engineers’ warnings went unheeded
because of a lack of credible supporting evidence. Regardless of
which theory better accounts for the sequence of events that hap-
pened that day, a system such as IBIS can help bring strong ratio-
nale and evidence to the attention of decision makers. It is
expected that the accountability that comes from its use has the
potential to make arguments persistent and coherently structured,
decision-making processes more participatory and to redistribute
power and control (Buckingham Shum, 1997). In essence, it can
make the arguments underpinning key decisions more explicit
and transparent which can support decisions made during the
development as well as support the decision making processes
during in-service diagnoses of complex engineered systems.
6.3. Towards richer causation knowledge bases
A key strategy to support engineering work is to develop and
exploit knowledge bases. In particular, we refer to the knowledge
typically documented by engineers through design methods and
in technical reports. This research has shown that causation knowl-
edge can be enriched with two important pieces of information.
The first is the rationale for why the events in a causal chain
occurred and led to specific effects. The second is information link-
ing failure modes, useful and harmful functions, and product struc-
ture. For example, the FAD method has captured the relationshipbetween erosion as a failure mode for the seals in the joint, the
behaviour of the seals under specific environmental conditions,
and the configuration of the seals and the joint. This work can be
seen as aligning to the efforts (Stone et al., 2005a, 2005b) to create
representations linking functional and failure mode information.
However, while in the above research the knowledge was manu-
ally extracted from technical reports and presented through a
matrix-based approach, this research has proposed a representa-
tion for live documentation during failure investigations.7. Limitations and further work
The main limitation of this work is related to the data used to
populate the IBIS and FAD structures. Publicly available technical
reports typically cover only the line or lines of investigation that
led to the main root causes. Hence, they do not allow mapping
the alternatives that an investigation team may have considered
while carrying out the work. In addition, reports do not permit
mapping the tasks that an investigation team may have identified,
justified to management and executed to collect necessary evi-
dence. To gather this type of information there is a need to carry
out studies, which involve participation in real investigations.
Various lines of future work are possible to extend this research.
The IBIS-based method for root cause analysis was applied to study
accident causation but, in line with our argument in Section 6, it
could be applied to understand problems that emerge during
design and development. In addition, our application of the FAD
method was confined to developing understanding of the joint
behaviour. However, the FAD method lends itself well to hierarchi-
cal modelling (i.e., modelling at different levels of the product
breakdown structure of a system) and therefore could be used to
model what happened to the Space Shuttle Challenger beyond
the aft field joint to show how the problem propagated. It would
also be interesting to explore application of the FAD method to
model the communication which led to the decision to launch
the Space Shuttle Challenger.8. Conclusions
The increasing complexity of engineered systems makes it diffi-
cult to identify all the possible failure modes during design leading
to numerous in-service adverse events. Improving the efficacy of
current tools for root cause analysis was identified as an important
issue both to support investigation teams and to create rich legacy
data from which teams can learn. This research has proposed the
concept of using both the IBIS and FAD methods to support an
enhanced approach to the root cause analysis of complex engi-
neered systems. Specifically, the approach allows tracing enriched
event chains, and understanding what system components failed,
how the system components interacted and how and why redesign
solutions will prevent accident reoccurrence. The research
contributes to root cause analysis and engineering design at four
levels.
The IBIS method was shown to enable the capture of justified
cause–effect trees. In particular, a multilevel cause–effect chain
was enriched with argument-based design rationale and therefore
its ability to explain a complex series of events augmented. This is
a characteristic that sets it apart from traditional methods for root
cause analysis.
Although functional reasoning has been applied in failure pre-
vention, e.g., FMEA, this research has proposed a first-of-its-kind
application of functional modelling in failure analysis. FAD-style
functional modelling, capturing intricate aspects of the events
leading to the failure of a complex system, was argued to support
reasoning to understand failure causation. The method has
256 M. Aurisicchio et al. / Safety Science 85 (2016) 241–257potential to be applied both with traditional and systemic methods
for root cause analysis and addresses the need for more sophisti-
cated models of causality based on systems thinking and system
theory (Leveson, 2011).
The IBIS method was also shown to be a flexible tool as in addi-
tion to supporting root cause analysis, it was used to capture and
justify redesign decisions and more importantly to trace them to
the initiating problems in a way that validates their effectiveness.
Finally, the research has introduced a software tool, known as
designVUE, to produce information models based on the IBIS and
FAD methods, and integrate them using various forms of
hyperlinks in a way that support root cause analyses.
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